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CHAPTER I
RATIONALE
Deutsch (1959) indicated that individuals who score low on the
F scale (which is a measure of authoritarianism) were significantly
more trusting and trustworthy than individuals who score high.
Christie and Cook (1956) suggested that individuals who score high
on the F scale were also less intellectually sophisticated, less
liberal in their political views, more cynical concerning human
nature, more prejudiced toward minority groups, and to have
experienced and to favor stricter child rearing practices, besides
being more authoritarian.
It is felt that dogmatism, which is a measure of open and
closed mindedness, may also be a valid predictor of trust and
trustworthiness due to the fact that the findings of Rokeach (1960)
indicate that dogmatism and authoritarianism have a correlational
range of .54 to .82.
Since dogmatism is an integral variable in the study,
clarification of the terra is needed.
Because of the varied aspects of the subject, it is felt that
an operational definition is necessary to qualify what is meant by
the terms open and closed mindedness.

In every situation it is

assumed that there are characteristics of relevant or irrelevant
quality to the inner structure of that situation.

In order to
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arrive at the correct response, the individual must respond to the
relevant characteristics of the situation and selectively ignore the
irrelevant ones.

If this is accomplished, it may then be said that

the individual responded appropriately.

If he becomes preoccupied

with the irrelevant information and makes a decision based on it,
more than likely, it will be an incorrect decision and classified as
an inappropriate response.

As a result it is extremely important

that each individual adequately evaluate the information he receives
from every situation to the fullest degree possible.
This illustrates the basic characteristics that define to what
degree a persons' system is "open" or "closed"; namely:
. . . the extent to which the person can receive, evaluate
and act on relevant information received from the outside
on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant
factors in the situation arising from within the person
or from the outside (Rokeach, 1960).
Examples of irrelevant internal pressures that interfere with
realistic reception of information are:
. . . unrelated habits, beliefs, and perceptual cues,
irrational ego motives, power needs, the need for
self-aggrandizement, the need to alloy anxiety, and
so forth. By irrelevant external pressures we have
in mind most particularly the pressures of reward and
punishment arising from external authority figures,
reference groups, social and institutional norms, and
cultural norms (Rokeach, 1960).
From the above explanation of open and closed mindedness, it
is deduced that the more open one's belief system the more he is
influenced by internal self-actualization forces and less by
irrational forces; the more he is able to shun pressure from external
sources; the more action and evaluation proceed independently on
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their own merits according to the inner structural requirements of
the situation; and the more strength one has to resist externally
imposed reinforcements, such as material reward or punishment.
On the other hand, the more closed the belief system the more
difficult it is to separate information received about the source
and about the world.

They become entangled to the point of

disguising the real topic.

What the external sources want us to

believe is true becomes confused with what the external source
depicts as true, yielding an individual who cannot distinguish the
two kinds of information.

This type of individual is not free to

receive, evaluate, and respond on information in terms of inner
requiredness.

He is exposed to pressure, rewards and punishments

dealt by the environment which is supposed to influence his
evaluation in the manner the source directs.

The above comprises

the definition of dogmatism.
As mentioned previously, it is felt that dogmatism may be a
valid predictor of trust and trustworthiness.

Verification of such

a statement will be attempted with the assistance of a two person
non-zero sum game, which essentially is a bargaining situation
whereby two individuals observe and interpret each other's behavior.
The bargaining situation is a study of the strategy of conflict,
illustrating situations in which the ability of one participant to
gain certain ends is dependent, to a great degree, on the decision
made by the partner.
The rationale for the belief that dogmatism may be a valid
predictor of trusting behavior i3 that, generally, an individual's
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behavior toward another person is congruent with what he expects from
that person.

Then too, what he expects from the other individual is

in line with his behavior toward that person, since Mead (1934) and
Parson (1955) state that "an individual's response pattern is
governed by not only 'how to act' toward others but also by 'what to
expect* from others".

An individual with a closed mind, a high

dogmatic person, would tend to expect and project hesitancy about
human trust and faith; whereas the open-minded individual, a low
dogmatic person, encounters greater human contact and believes that
the world, in general, is composed of honest, sincere human beings.
The open-minded person's vision and experiences are not as narrow
or "tunneled" as the closed-minded individual, since he is not
threatened by the inconsistencies or uncertainties of life.

His lines

of communication, both verbal and non-verbal, are more apt to receive
incoming information; as a result he is capable of greater objectivity
utilizing the largest amount of available information,

Evidence to

support such a viewpoint was found in a study by Conway (1967) —
concerned with problem solving in small groups as a function of open
and closed individual belief systems.

He found that open-minded

subjects are superior to closed-minded subjects in the area of
communication, problem solving time, and the general acceptance and
rejection of problems, groups, or overall situations.
The open-minded person displaces others* feelings on himself
and attempts to empathize with their situation,

Because of his

diversified encounters, it is realistic to state that he is more
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accepting of the faults of man and more yielding to counteropinions.
Evidence to support such a viewpoint may be found in the article by
Norris (1965) where she states that open-minded individuals are more
tolerant of situations involving cognitive inconsistency—uncertainty
in the act of knowing—than closed-minded individuals.

Hunt (1968)

also verified such findings of cognitive inconsistency in an experiment
concerned with the investigation of the relationship between open and
closed mindedness and tolerance for inconsistency under conditions in
which persons agree to prepare belief-discrepant communications for
subsequent public examinations.

As a result, it is felt that the

open-minded individual would be a more likely candidate to be trusting
and trustworthy than his closed-minded counterpart.
An explanation as to why low dogmatic individuals would be more
trusting and trustworthy than high dogmatic individuals is due not
only to one sided internalized expectations from another; instead,
they are internalizations of a reciprocal pattern of interrelationships
between the subject and his encounters.

This interrelationship is

governed not only by how to act toward the other, but also what to
expect from the other (Head, 1939, Parson, 1955).

The experiment by

Deutsch (1962) somewhat supports this belief since he concluded that,
in experiments concerning game situations, subjects who are trusting
tend to be trustworthy and subjects who are suspicious tend to be
untrustworthy.

In other words, an individual's response is based not

only on how he feels for an individual but what he expects from him.
Another explanation of high and low dogmatism could be centered
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around personality differences between the two, even though the
Wrightsoan study (1966) indicates that no attitude or personality
variable was found to be related to trustworthy behavior in a two
person game. Justification for the position that personality
differences exist between high dogmatic and low dogmatic individuals
is based on the concept that personality is a composite of both
inherited differences and learned or developmental differences due to
environmental impact. The former may bo referred to as "structural
differences" and the latter as "content differences".
The difference concerned with in this study does not reflect
structural differences in values as much as it does content differences.
These content differences have been internalized as a result of the
individual's reaction to his socialization experiences in a designated
social environment that is characterized by a given value pattern.
This viewpoint indicates that trusting people and suspicious people
do not differ in ego weakness or in the integration of the superego,
but differ simply from unique environmental experiences.

In other

words, these differences are learned rather than inherited.
Rokeach (1960) found that race, religion, educational background,
intelligence and age have an affect on open and closed mindedness.
Other areas affecting Dogmatism were the economic state of the
individual, his vocation, and his overall past experience.

No

evidence was found of a test for sex difference influencing the open
and closed mindedness of the individual.

A study by Rapaport (1965),

concerning sex as a factor in contributing to cooperation in the
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Prisoner's Dilemma Game, indicated that differences do exist between
sexes; however, the discrepancy is due to different social interaction
patterns between males and females rather than to contrasting, innate
propensities to cooperate.

Komorita (1965) also found a difference

between sexes where cooperative choice was concerned. He stated that
males reciprocated cooperative choice more than females when such
behavior maximized gain, but reciprocated less when such behavior was
non-optimal.

On the other side, however, Lutzker (1961) concluded,

from his study concerning sex role, cooperation and competition in a
Two Person Non-Zero Sum Game, that sex role did not influence
cooperative and competitive behavior.

Evans (1966) reaffirmed this

position by stating that sex was not related to cooperation in the
prisoner's dilemma game.
As a result of the conflict concerning sex differences and
cooperative choice where dogmatism is concerned, it is felt that
additional information is needed to supplement the already existing
pool of information in the area. Through additional information, a
greater degree of clarification may be attained as to what effects sex
differences have on individual attitudes once suitable norms are
established. Therefore this study will attempt to uncover to what
extent sex differences affect trusting responses in a two person
non-zero sura game where dogmatism is held constant.
In view of the discussion of the above material concerning
Dogmatism, trust and trustworthiness, and the Two Person Non-Zero Sum
Game it is felt that low dogmatic individuals will be more trusting
or trustworthy in a two person non-zero sum game than closed minded
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individuals due to a greater feeling of altruism and a stronger
capacity to deal with environmental inconsistency.

Low dogmatic

individuals will remain open-minded regardless of the treatment they
receive from others due to an overall flexibility to cope with the
environment.

It should be noted that such beliefs will be examined by

using only the initial response of each S as the basis of judgement,
since initial impressions at times are more congruent with the belief
structure of the individual at the moment.

It is also felt that sex

differences will exist among individuals participating in a two person
non-zero sum game as a result of social conditioning, which forces the
individuals to conform to an expected role by reinforcing the antici
pated behavior.

As a result it is hypothesized that during participation

in a two person non-zero sum game:
I.

Open-minded Ss will make more trusting first choice
responses than closed-minded Ss.

II.

Ss who have made a previous trusting, first choice
response will make a trustworthy, later choice response
regardless of whether the perceived first choice partner
responded trusting or untrusting; and Ss who have made
a previous untwisting, first choice response will make
an untrustworthy, later choice response regardless of
whether the perceived first choice partner responded
trusting or untrusting.

Ill,

A difference exists between males and females in the choice
of a trusting, first response where dogmatism is held
constant.
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QLATTER II

METHOD

Subjects

The £s for this study were undergraduate students from an
introductory psychology course at Southern Illinois University. The
Ss were chosen on the basis of the responses made to Rokeach's
Dogmatism Scale.

A total of 53 Ss were chosen from the Dogmatism

Scale to participate in the two person non-zero sum game, 27 openminded individuals of which 12 were male and 15 female, and 26
closed-minded individuals of which 14 were male and 12 female.

Instruments

The study was performed with the assistance of Rokeach's
Dogmatism Scale, the two person non-zero sura game, and an apparatus
known as a multiple response recorder.
The Dogmatism Scale is a personal opinion questionnaire whose
primary purpose is to measure individual differences in open and
closed belief systems. There are several versions of the scale, with
Form D and E being the most popular.

Form E was selected for the sake

of brevity and since the reliability figure of .79 was basod on the
largest normative sample of 508 Ss (Rokeach, 1960). The validity of
all forms was unknown due to an insufficient amount of existing
information.
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Form E contained a total of 40 questions (See page 32) to which
the Ss were forced to choose one of six alternatives (See page 35) for
each question, ranging from "I agree very much" to "I disagree very
much", in order to force responses toward agreement or disagreement.
The scale was subsequently converted for scoring purposes to a 1 to 6
point scale for each item score. The total score for each S_ was the
sum of scores obtained on all items in the test. The open-minded
(low dogmatic) Ss were the ones who scored the highest number of
total points, as compared to other members in the group, after summing
the scores on all the items. The closed-minded (high dogmatic) Ss
were the ones who scored the lowest number of total points.
The two person non-zero sum game is a game

based on "bargaining"

in which two individuals watch and interpret each others behavior.
This bargaining situation is, in essence, a study of the strategy
of conflict.

It is illustrative of situations in which the ability of

one participant to gain certain ends is dependent, to an important
degree, on the choices or decisions that tho other participants will
make. The bargaining may be explicit, as when one offers a concession;
or it may be by tacit maneuver, as when one occupies or evacuates
strategic territory.

It may seek arrangements that yield positive

gains for both parties; or it may involve threats of damage, including
mutual damage.
Whatever the rationale for their choices, both parties are aware
that his own actions are being interpreted and anticipated, and both
respond according to the expectations that they create.
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To obtain further information concerning the exact operational
method and procedures of the Sum Game used in this study, refer to
Appendix F which will discuss those matters in greater detail.
The multiple response recorder was the instrument used to
indicate to both the Ss and IE the point selection made by each during
the two person non-zero sum game.
A physical description of the response recorder is as follows:
approximately 12 inches tall, lh inches wide, and 12 inches deep, with
five sides of the recorder composed of wood and the one remaining side
composed of sheet metal with one-half inch green lights spaced
approximately one inch apart.

The bottom row of the recorder consisted

of red buttons used to indicate the desired choice.

The green lights

in the recorders were exposed in selected areas to designate a
different numerical reward for each area (a frontal view of the
recorder may be seen on page 37).
There were four (4) recorders used for the two person non-zero
sum game positioned on each side of a rectangular table.

The recorders

were separated by black curtains in order to prevent visual contact
which may have lead to communication which was contrary to the game
rules (an aerial view of the game room may be seen on page 36).
Before each recorder, on a white sheet of paper, lay the possible
reward combinations for each game in order to inform the Ss as to the
alternatives available for every game and also the possible outcomes
of a specific choice.

The payoff sheet was seen as such:
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AX

.(

+9

+9

)

AY

(

-10

+10

)

BX

(

+10

-10

)

BY

(

-9

-9

)

The person with first choice was limited to the payoffs written in red
while the person with last choice was limited to the payoffs written
in blue.*
Procedure
The Dogmatism Scale was administered, on a voluntary basis by a
person other than the E, to 158 £s of an introductory psychology
course at Southern Illinois University with the implication that the
scale was to function as a personal opinion questionnaire.
* The payoff was in terms o f points rather than money
for the obvious reason of cost to the experimentor.
It was suspected, however, that this would not alter
game strategy to any significant degree, since the
Wrightsman study (1966) indicated that in a two person
game, playing for real versus imaginary payoffs had
little influence on the £*s game behavior.
The designated numerical rewards and point spread was
obtained from the Deutsch study (I960) where identical
numerical rewards were used successfully for a similar
study concerning the Two Person Non-Zero Sum Game.
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Direct instructions to the Ss were as follows:
The following is a study of what the general public
thinks and feels about a number of important social
and personal questions. The best answer to each
statement below is your personal opinion. We have
tried to cover many different and opposing points of view;
you may find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the
statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others,
and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or
disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many
people feel the same as you do.
Mark each statement on the answer sheet according to
how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark
every one and only one mark for each question.
This masking was instituted for several reasons—1.) to
facilitate a free expression of ideas, and 2.) to allow such
expression to materialize without the impending threat of further
participation in future experimentation.
Several weeks after the administration and scoring of the
Dogmatism Scale, the class was revisited. At that time the students
were informed that a certain number of individuals were selected,at
random, to participate in a psychology experiment. The remaining
students who were not eligible for game participation due to inadequate
dogmatism scores were informed that they would participate in another
psychology experiment at a later date. Such instruction wa3 given to
create a mutual feeling of class participation in order to engender
a serious concern from the Ss actively involved. There was no
connection made, whatsoever, to the opinion questionnaire the Ss had
previously completed.
The Ss that were to participate in the sum game received the
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following instructions on the information sheet that was circulated
about the class:
If your identification number is on this paper, you are
to place your name and I.D. number on the time sheet for
the date and time slot you desire. Try to fill-in a
time slot where others have indicated their preference,
since 4 individuals are needed in each slot to participate
in the experiment. It would be desirable to have two (2)
males and two (2) females for each time slot.
Report to the "psychology laboratory", Room 3209, Science
Building at the time ana date of your choice.
It is vital that you report promptly at that time, so
PLEASE BE ON TIME!
Of the 53 eligible Ss, 40 Ss responded positively to the "sign-up"
sheet, and 36 eventually appeared to participate in the game. There
were 18 high dogmatic Ss and 18 low dogmatic Ss, with a sex ratio of
9 males to 9 females for the closed-minded group and a ratio of 7 males
to 11 females for the open-minded group.

Every game contained at least

one member of the opposite sex, since idontical sex pairings for a
game may produce a different degree of cooperation or competition than
mixed sex pairings as evidenced in the study by Rapaport (1965).
A period of seven days existed between sign-up and actual game
participation. This time was used to pretest the apparatus and game
instructions so that all points of confusion could be irradicated
before actual game participation.
On the days specified for game involvement, for the most part
the Ss adhered to the specified time schedule.

Upon entering the

laboratory, the Ss were handed an information sheet to complete,
concerning family birth order.

After the information was gathered.
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the Ss were led to the game room where the apparatus and game
instructions were examined.

As the Ss entered the room, they were

instructed to select a seat in front of a multiple response recorder
(A graphic view of the seating arrangement and apparatus arrangement
is illustrated on page 36).

The Ss were then instructed as to the

name of the game, the object of the game, the exact operational
procedures of the game (verbatim game instructions are illustrated in
Appendix F).

After the instructions were read aloud and clarified to

the satisfaction of each S, commencement of the two person non-zero
sum game began.
A total of 3 games were played by each group of 4 Ss.

In every

game each person was limited to one of the two choice positions,
either first choice or last choice.

When the

was designated to

choose first, selection was limited to either Letter A or Letter B.
When the S was designated to choose last, selection was limited to
either Letter X or Letter Y.

The amount of reward each individual

won or lo3t was determined by the S_'s placement as a result of the
respective choice.
From the illustrated reward combinations, it may be seen that the
person of first choice could attain the most or lose the least by
selecting Letter B.
+10 or -9.

If B was decided upon, the reward was either a

Letter B was the most rewarding since Letter A's greatest

reward value was +9, and it was the least detracting since Letter A's
poorest reward value was a -10.
In the case of the person with last choice, he could have won
the most or lost the least by selecting Letter Y, because such a
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choice yielded a +10 as compared to X's +9, and -9 as compared to
X's -10.

If there was a choice of BY, by the persons of first choice

and last choice respectively, both forfeited 9 points.
The one solution, however, in order for both players to score
positively was to choose combination AX,

This combination yielded a

+9 for each participant.
If, on the other hand, the person with first choice was assured
that his counterpart would select X, he could have won more by
selecting B.

The same was true for the person with last choice; if the

£ was assured that the person with first choice was going to choose A,
he could have won more by selecting Y.
To define the above explanation in terms of what play was
considered trusting or untrusting, or trustworthy or untrustworthy the
following was illustrated:

Whenever an individual was slated to

choose first, he could have chosen either Letter A or Latter B.

If

the S attempted to secure a maximum profit for himself while inflicting
the maximum loss to his associate, he would have selected B which was
considered an "untrusting play".

If the £ chose to compromise somewhat

and obtain a smaller reward for himself, yet assisting his associate
in obtaining the same amount, the £ would have selected A which was
considered a "trusting play".
When the individual was given the opportunity to choose last,
the S could have selected either letter X or letter Y,

The same

applied to him now as it did when he was given the opportunity to
choose first.

If he attempted to secure a profit for himself while
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incurring the greatest loss to his associate, he would have selected Y
which was considered an "untrustworthy play".

On the other hand, if

the £ had faith in his associate, he would have selected X, a "trust
worthy play", hoping to obtain a profit both for himself and his
associate.

(A more thorough explanation of the game is given in

Appendix F if needed.)
The one significant aspect of this game was that, unless mutual
trust existed, there was no possibility for "rational" individual
behavior.

Conditions were built into the game to cause each person

to lose, should he attempt to obtain either maximum gain or minimum
loss.

Only unless the players trusted each other would it have made

sense to choose the other alternative.
As stated, the Ss played a total of three games;

on one occasion

they were allowed to choose first; here the £ decided as to whether
he was going to be trusting or untrusting.
On the other two occasions the subject chose last.

This

position allowed him the choice of being either trustworthy or
untrustworthy.

On one of the occasions of last choice, the stimulus

he received, from what he thought was one of the other players, was
a trusting response of Letter A.

On the other occasion of last choice,

the stimulus received, from what he thought was one of the other
players, was an untrusting response of Letter B.
As the Ss were assigned to the position of "last choice" the
sequence of the received stimuli was alternated from player to player.
For instance, Participant I received a trusting stimulus first, to
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which he was to respond, and an untrusting stimulus last.
II was subjected to the reverse order.

Participant

He received an untrusting

stimulus first, to which he was to respond, and a trusting stimulus
last.

This sequence was upheld throughout the study to control for

any predetermined set given to the players as a result of the type of
stimulus received initially.

Such treatment was supported by the

Littig study (1965) where it was discovered that behavior of Ss deviate
from expectations in two-person games; it was suggested that these
deviations were the result of the Ss following the action of the
other persons with whom they interact.

In other words; the Ss were

influenced by the "other player's move".
In administration of the game, extra precaution was taken to
insure that all Ss fully understood the instructions and the impli
cations of any combination of choices that the £ or their associate
might make.

The Ss were assured that their counterparts had similar

knowledge of the game.

There was no orientation given to the Ss in

regard to motivation or competition, since Deutsch (1960) indicated
that a cooperative orientation, in a Two Person Non-Zero Sum Game,
would lead to trusting and trustworthy behavior while a competitive
orientation would lead to suspicious and untrustworthy behavior.
Deutsch (1961) also indicated that when threat was present in such
a game to both players, rather than one, agreement was most difficult;
then too, when conditions of no threat existed for either participant,
payoff was maximized.
There was no information given about

their associates other than
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they were in the sane psychology course.

Upon completion of the

intended three games, duration of which was approximately twenty m?nutes,
the Ss were thanked for their cooperation, punctuality, and serious
concern and were dismissed from the room in order to accomodate the
following four (4) Ss.
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CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
A total of 60 Ss were desired to participate in the two person
non-zero sum game.

Of the 60 Ss, 53 were found eligible to participate

in the game due to the high and low dogmatic qualities of these
individuals. However, only 36 Ss eventually volunteered to take part
in the game.
The total score for each S was the sum of scores obtained on all
items in the questionnaire. The individual total scores of the study
ranged from 95 to 210 with a mean of 145 and a standard deviation of
20,8 as comparod to a mean of 148 and a standard deviation of 26,1
from Rokeach's (1960) original normative sample. The majority of Ss
selected to participate in the game scored either above or below • 1 s.d.
from the mean.
The responses made by the Ss for the game wore analyzed with the
assistance of a Chi Square test of significance of the 2 X 2 classifi
cation design. Since small cell frequency appeared in some cases, the
Yates Correction Factor was used to insure the greatest degree of
accuracy of chance estimate probabilities.
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TABLE I
Frequency of Trusting and
Untrusting Responses by
Ss Classified as High
Dogmatic and Low Dogmatic
Response
Trusting

......

9

10

19

Untrusting ......

9

8

17

Total ...... 18

18

36

*X
-V* = • o o , p> • oWfs
A

TABLE 2
Frequency of Later Trusting
and Untrusting Responses by Ss
Who were Initially Trusting"
Response

Stimulus11Received
A

B

Total

Trusting Response.,..

4

3

7

Untrusting Response..

6

6

12

10

9

19

Total

* X Z - -03 , P > OS
Note: Stimulus A is used to indicate that
the S was given a trusting stimulus in Game 2
and an untrusting stimulus in Game 3. Stimulus B
is used to indicate that the S was given an
untrusting stimulus in Game
and a trusting
stimulus in Game 3.
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TABLE 3

Frequency of Later Trusting and
Untrusting Responses by Ss who
Were Initially Untrust*ing
Response

Stimulus Received
A

B

Total

1

2

3

Untrusting Response... 9

5

14

7

17

Trusting Response..,..

Total

10

*X* - Z.L7, p > >05
Note: Stimulus A is used to indicate that
the S was given a trusting stimulus in Game 2
and an untrusting stimulus in Game 3. Stimulus B
is used to indicate that the S was given an
untrusting stimulus in Game 27 and a trusting
stimulus in Game 3.

TABLE 4

Frequency of Trusting and Untrusting
Responses for Males and Pemales
Where Low Dogmatic Attitudes are Held Constant
Response of Low
Dogmatic Ss.

Sex Difference
penaje potai

Trusting Response .....

3

7

10

Untrusting Response....

4

4

8

Total

7

11

18

* X 2 * • ft / P >•

as
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TABLE 5
Frequency of Trusting and Untrusting
Responses for Males and Females
Where High Dogmatic Attitudes are
Held Constant
Response of High
Dogmatic Ss.

Sex Difference
Male

Female Total

Trusting Response ......

5

Untrusting Response.....

459

Total

9

4

9

9

18

.00, p > . OS

From the above computations, it is needless to say that the
results do not confirm the hypothesis that the Dogmatism Scale is

a

valid predictor of responses in a Two Person Non-Zero Sum Game.
The findings of Table 1 indicated that there was no significant
difference between high dogmatic and low dogmatic Ss in choice
selections concerning trust and trustworthiness.

The results of

Table 2 suggested that those Ss who made previous trusting first choice
responses did not, to any significant degree, make trustworthy later
choice responses regardless of whether the first choice partner
responded trusting or untrusting.

Similar findings were disclosed in

Table 3; the Ss who made previous untrusting first choice responses
did not, to any significant degree, make untrustworthy later choice
responses regardless of whether the perceived first choice partner
responded trusting or untrusting.

The results of Table 4 indicated
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that there was no significant difference between males and females
concerning their choice of a trusting first response.

This sex

difference was investigated with Ss that i«re considered low in
dogmatism.

Table 5 was also concerned with the affects of sex

differences on trusting first choice responses, with the exception
of using high dogmatic Ss rather than low dogmatic Ss.

As with

Table 4, the results indicated that there was no significant difference
between males and females concerning their choice of a trusting first
response.
Even though the hypotheses were non-confirmable, and the results
could have occurred more by chance than for any other reason, it is
felt that such a treatment may be practicable given some additional
alterations to the original proposal.

This will be discussed at

greater length in the following section with hopes of irradicating
some of the weaknesses of the study, yet at the same time, stimulating
the reader, perhaps to further investigation or experimentation in the
area.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
As evidenced, the hypotheses in the present study were not
substantiated.

Possible explanations as to the non-confirmation of

the hypotheses are as follows:

First, perhaps the pre-game instructions

indicating that the two person non-zero sun game is not a competitive
game created a situation that spoiled the basic trusting or untrusting
set of the individual. Ss that were normally untrusting in competitive
or ambiguous situations may not have felt pressure to conform to their
usual operational tactics for this game.

As a result they responded

at times with trusting behavior without the threat of any significant
penalty. Trusting Ss, on the other hand, may have selected untrusting
responses simply to view what feedback they would receive from their
partners, most likely hoping for untrusting replies in order to
strengthen their beliefs in the trusting philosophy.
Second, this study, as outlined originally, was to have used a
total of 60 Ss.

Due to a lack of cooperation from some of the Ss,

however, the sample size was reduced to a total of 36 Ss.

Perhaps

had the sample size been larger, the original hypotheses might have
been substantiated.
Third, had there been a greater number of games played than three,
the Ss may have responded differently due to a change in attitude or
motivation after warm-up.

Familiarity with a process at times releases
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inhibitory feeling felt by the participants initially, resulting in a
total change of game strategy later on. Therefore, the warm-up effect
may have been influential to some degree on the Ss that participated
in the game.

This viewpoint is supported by the findings of McClintock

(1967), in an experiment concerning the effects of prior experience
and monetary reward on a 2-choice non-zero sum game.

He found that

both of the above factors, as well as the number of times the game is
played, are influential as to the final outcome of the game.

Lave

(1965) indicated that three factors were important in affecting
cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. One of the three factors
listed was the number of times the game will he repeated.
The fourth factor that may have contributed to the non-confirmation
of the hypotheses was the clarity of the pro-game instructions. The
directions were written as succinctly as possible and were supplemented
by visual aids for clarification purposes.

Instructions wore read

aloud and illustrated to the Ss simultaneously, and the final step was
to fully clarify any remaining questions plaguing the Ss before game
time.

However, regardless of the care exerted, there is still the

possibility of confusion on the part of the Ss as to a knowledgable
operation of the game itself, or the consequences of their individual
point selections.

Either could have contributed, to some degree, to

the eventual outcome of the study.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In summary, 158 Ss were administered Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale
in order to identify the most open and closed-minded individuals of
the sample. Thirty-six (36) 5s eventually qualified and volunteered
to participate in tho Two Person Non-Zero Sum Game.

It v/as the

purpose of the study to demonstrate that tho Dogmatism Scale could be
used as a valid predictor of responses in a Two Person Non-Zero Sura
Game by illustrating that open-minded (low dogmatic) individuals were
more trusting than closed-raindod (high dogmatic) individuals. Three
hypotheses were established to verify the intention of the study.
I,

During participation in a two person non-zero sum
game, open-minded individuals will make significantly
more trusting first choice responses than closed-minded
individuals.

II.

During participation in a two porson non-zoro sun
game, individuals who have made a previous trusting,
first choice response will significantly make a
trusting, later choice response regardless of
whether the perceived first choice partner responded
trustworthy or untrustworthy; and individuals who
have made a previous untrusting, first choice response
will significantly make an untrusting, later choice
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response regardless of whether the perceived first
choice partner responded trustworthy or untrustworthy.
III.

Holding dogmatism constant, a significant 3ex
difference exists in the selection of a trusting,
first choice response.

It was discovered, through the use of a Chi Square test of
significance that there were no differences between high dogmatic and
low dogmatic Ss where trust and trustworthiness was concerned.
Individuals who made trusting responses for first choice did not, to
a significant degree, choose a trustworthy response on the last choice
regardless of the stimulus received.

Also, individuals who made un-

trusting responses for first choice did not choose an untrustworthy
response on the last choice regardless of the stimulus received.

There

were no differences found between males and females concerning the
selection of a trusting response upon first choice.
Possible explanations as to the lack of confirmation of the
hypotheses were:

1.)

damage to the basic trusting/untrusting set of

the Ss due to pre-garae instructions, 2.)

too small a sample size,

3.)

possible effects of warm-up on individual decision making, and

'+.)

a confusion of pre-gaine instructions.
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Appendix A

Dogmatism Scale Questionnaire

The following is a study of what the general public thinks and
feels about a number of important social and personal questions. The
best answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have
tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may
find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing
just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others;
whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that
many people feel the same as you do.
Mark each statement on the answer sheet according to how much you
agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one and only one mark for
each question.
I AGREE A LITTLE

I DISAGREE A LITTLE

I AGREE ON TIE WHOLE

I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE

I AGREE VERY MUCH

I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in
common.
2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest
form of democracy is a government run by those who are most
intelligent.
3.

Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile
goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom
of certain political groups.

4.

It is only natural that a person would have a much better
acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he
opposes.

5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome
place.
7.

Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

8.

I'd like it if I could find somone who would tell me how to
solve my personal problems.

33

9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of
the future.
10. There is so Touch to be done and so little time to do it in.
11.

Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.

12.

In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself
several times to make sure I ara being understood.

13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in
what I am goint to say that I forget to listen to what others
are saying.
14. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.
15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, ray secret
ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or
Beethoven, or Shakespeare.
16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something
important,
17.

If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to
the world.

18.

In the history of mankind there have probably been just a
handful of really great thinkers.

19. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of
the things they stand for.
20.

A man who does not believe in some great cause has not
really lived.

21. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause
that life becomes meaningful.
22.

Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world
there is probably only one which is correct.

23.

A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely
to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.

24. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous
because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.
25.

When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must
be careful not to compromise with those who believe
differently from the way we do.
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26.

In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he
considers primarily his own happiness.

27.

The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly
the people who believe in the same thing he does.

28.

In times like these it is often necessary to be more on
guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's
own camp than by those in the opposing camp.

29.

A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion
among its own members cannot exist for long.

30.

There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are
for the truth and those who are against the truth.

31.

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit
he's wrong.

32.

A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath
contempt,

33.

Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the
paper they are printed on.

34.

In this complicated world of ours the only way wo can know
what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be
trusted.

35.

It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going
on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those
one respects.

36.

In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and
associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.

37.

The present is all too often full of unhappiness.
the future that counts.

38.

If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes
necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all".

39.

Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed
important social and moral problems don't really understand
what's going on,

40.

Most people just don't know what's good for then.

It is only
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Appendix B
Record Number

ANSWER SHEET
I Agree
Very
Much

I Agree
On The
Whole

I Agree
A
Little

I Disagree
A
Little

I Disagree
On The
Whole

I Disagree
Very
Much
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Appendix F
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE TWO PERSON
NON-ZERO SUM GAME
My name is Tony Mance and I am a graduate student in psychology
at this university.

You have been invited to participate in an experiment

that qualifies as research material for a thesis topic at the Masters
level.
The game you have been invited to play is known as a Two Person
Non-Zero Sum Game.

Since individual differences dictate how each of

us participate in novel situations, it stands to reason that the
majority of individuals treat a game situation uniquely.

Therefore,

the rationale for the use of this game is to see how each of you
approach a particular game setting.
The object of this game is to accumulate as many positive points
for yourself as possible.

This may be accomplished by either

cooperating with your unknown associate or by competing against him.
This is up to you!

However, the total points obtained by you will not

be compared to those points obtained by other members participating in
the game.

In other words, you will not be judged against one another

since this is not a competitive game.

In addition, the score you will

receive will be an individual score for each of the three games.
The game will consist of 4 players.

For each play you will be

paired off with one of the other members of the group, whose identity
will remain anonomous to you.

For each game, you ma£ or may not

exchange partners—remember that!

There will be a total number of
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three games played by each player and the duration of all three games
will, more than likely, not exceed ten minutes.

Some of you may respond

first during the games more times than last and vice versa.

Once you

have taken your assigned positions, all conversation will cease, since
no verbal communication is allowed as part of the game rules.
You may now take a seat in the assigned positions so that further
instructions may be given as to the exact operation of the game.

But

before I go any further, are there any questions concerning what has
been said thus far?

Should questions arise at any time during the

instructions, do not hesitate to stop me so that they may be fully
clarified.
The box you see in front of you is known as a multiple response
recorder.

Its appearance and use will now be explained in detail so

you may be familiar with the apparatus.

As you can see there is a

white card covering the front of your recorder, exposing lights in
certain areas.

The left side of the card is marked Letter A or Letter B,

alternatives available when you have first choice in a game.

The right

side of the card is marked Letter X or Letter Y, alternatives available
when you have last choice in a game.

At the bottom of the box are RED

response buttons used to designate your choice of either A, B, X, or Y.
There are BLUE diagonal arrows on the card.

Do you see them?

They are

used to indicate the direction you should look for the "final outcome
response" made by your partner.

Indication as to whether or not you

have first or last choice will be designated by the light marked
"Signal for 1st Choice".

Do you see it on the white card?

When this

light is on, it means that you are the one to choose first in the game.
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You will be told verbally when to look for the signal®

If you do not

see the signal when the commentator states that it is on, then you are
to automatically assume that you have been given the position of last
choice.

Is everything clear so far?

You may now press the response buttons

to see how they work while the use of the apparatus is being explained.
If you are given first choice in the game, your selections are
limited to either Letter A or Letter B located in the lower left-hand
corner of the recorder.

Upon your selection of a letter, you are to

follow the diagonal arrow to the upper right-hand comer of the
recorder, where you will receive information as to the selection of
either Letter X or Letter Y by your partner.
If you are given the position of last choice, whose alternatives
are Letter X or Letter Y, you will first receive knowledge of your
partner'8 selection in the upper left-hand comer of the recorder, and
your response will be made in the lower right-hand comer.

It should

be noted that any selections made by either of the participants will
simultaneously be acknowledged to the other partner so that both
players will always be aware of their partner's intended point selection.
The last variable to be explained in the instructions, and perhaps
the most important, is a thorough understanding of the reward system,
this is the critical part of the game, so listen carefully.
The white sheet of paper you see before you is entitled "Possible
Reward Combinations".

There are four such possible combinations

illustrated and are identified by the letters AX, AY, BX, BY.

As you

can see each combination is enclosed by a parenthesis with 2 numbers
assigned to it.
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Some of the letters and numbers are written in red and some in
blue.

The color red is used to designate the rewards available when you

have first choice.

The color blue is used to designate the rewards

available when you have last choice.
If you are nominated for first choice, your selection will be
limited to either Letter A or Letter B, and you may receive the numbers
written in RED in the parentheses.
If you are nominated for last choice, your selection will be
limited to Letter X or Letter Y, and you may receive the numbers
written in BLUE in the parentheses.
Now, once again, listen carefully for this is important.

The key

to points obtained by each player hinges on the decision made by the
person with last choice.

He is the one to decide the final points

obtained by both players for that game.

In other words he, the person

with last choice, is in the "driver's seat" as to the points obtained
by both players.
For example, should you choose first and select A, you may receive
either a +9 or a -10 depending on the choice of your partner.

If he

decides on X, you will be forced to receive a +9 and he will receive a
+9.

Should he decide on Y, you will be forced to receive a -10 and he

will receive a +10.

A similar situation is true for Letter B as for

Letter A, except for different numerical rewards.
Once again, when given the signal of first choice, you will respond
by pushing the button you desire for the Letter you desire.

When this

is accomplished the letter you have selected will light up simultaneously
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in both boxes, so as to inform the person of last choice as to your
selection.

When the person of last choice is to take his pick, he

will respond in the same manner as you, with the exception of selecting
either Letter X or Letter Y instead of Letter A or Letter B.

His

selecting will be done by pressing the button of his choice for the
desired letter.

This action will produce the illumination of that

choice in both his recorder and in the one of his associate's.

Letters

selected by both players will indicate to each the final outcome of
their selections, which means the number of points they, individually,
will receive for that game.
Are there any questions?

Do you understand everything that we

have covered?
Once again, here are some important variables to keep in mind
during the game:
1.

There will be a total of 3 games played by each player.

2.

Your partner will be unknown to you, and you will not have
the same partner for each game.

3.

The possible combination of points for each game are listed
before you in parentheses with AX, AY, BX, and BY as the choices.

4.

You are to obtain as many positive points as possible.

You

will not be judged against your fellow players since this
game is not a competitive one.
Upon completion of the formalized instructions, additional
instruction, for clarification purposes, was administered to those
individuals in need of further assistance in order to participate in
the game.

